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A holistic approach to criminal justice scholarship
The narrowfocus of law school curriculaand academic analysis
is at least partly responsiblefor the public's lack of confidence
in the criminaljustice system.
by William T. Pizzi

Teaching criminal procedure

T

he
public is justice
clearly sysangry American
with the criminal
tem and has little confidence in it.
This is apparent from public opinion
polls and in statement after statement
from victims who fairly shout that the
criminal justice system systematically
ignores their interests and those of the
broader public. And, of course, this
anger is reflected in political rhetoric
where every politician wants to be perceived as tough on crime.
Although responsibility is widespread, the academic community must
take a large share of the blame for loss
of public confidence in the criminal
justice system. There are two reasons
for this. First, law schools are not giving students an adequate perspective
from which to view the system. While
they do a good job of training students
to think like lawyers to the extent that
graduates are comfortable navigating
Supreme Court case law and are well
WILLIAM T. PIZZI is a professor at the University of Colorado School of Law.

prepared to function within the system, they graduate students who have
very little perspective on the system as
a whole and no training at thinking
critically about it. Training a student to
think like a lawyer now has a negative
connotation in the criminal area. It indicates someone who can talk glibly
58 Judicature Volume 79, Number 2

yers, have lost confidence.
While this 'essay is about law professors and how they train their students,
this is equally an essay about lawyers
and judges who practice in and help
shape the system. Clearly, the causal
mechanics between those teaching
about the system and those working in
it go both ways. While law professors
may have some influence on the system, the system has considerably more
influence on them and on what they
must teach if the students they-train
are to be successful. To the extent that
the criticisms made here about the way
law professors teach and analyze legal
issues are valid, they apply equally to
the way issues are argued, analyzed,
and resolved within the criminal justice system.

about "rights" and about this decision
or that decision but lacks the ability to
see the system in broader perspective.
The second reason for lack of confidence involves the quality of academic
analysis. Too often scholarship in the
criminal area rests on truncated and
incomplete analysis. A strong system of
criminal justice should strive to
achieve a number of objectives that
can conflict with each other. It should
treat those who come in contact with
the system-whether as defendants,
victims, or witnesses-with dignity and
respect. It should have procedures
that allow it to determine guilt or innocence with a high degree of reliability.
And it should make wise and careful
use of its limited resources. But much
scholarship begins and ends by focusing on the treatment of suspects and
the constitutional rights of defendants, while overlooking any consideration of other legitimate and important goals.
When one combines the way law students are taught about the criminal
justice system and the way academics
analyze criminal justice problemsand the two are obviously related-it
comes as no surprise that in 1995 we
have a system that is heavily proceduralized, one that places a high
premium on lawyers and their skills. At
the same time, however, it is a system
in which many citizens, and some law-
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The typical course in criminal procedure focuses on the U.S. Constitution,
with very heavy emphasis on the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The
course covers the major doctrines in
those areas, such as the exclusionary
rule, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, the meaning of
probable cause, the mechanics of warrants, various specific search categories, stop and frisk, Miranda warnings,
the meaning of interrogation, the public safety exception to Miranda, attempts to elicit information from a suspect after the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment, and, finally, various doctrines relating to operation of the exclusionary rules.
Focusing a course on criminal procedure this way provides students
some perspective on the police and
what they do but very little perspective
from which to examine the roles lawyers and judges play. It also deludes
students into thinking that the investigative process is the heart of criminal
procedure, and that it can be considered in isolation.
This is a serious mistake. Law school
should force students to understand
that the criminal justice system is an integrated whole that functions only as
well as its weakest part. It is no good
having the best investigative procedures in the world if the trial system
screens out too much reliable evidence or doesn't allow the evidence

that is admitted to be properly tested
and evaluated. And it is also no good
having the best trial procedures in the
world if the investigative process does
not allow the system to gather sufficient evidence to convict the guilty
and acquit the innocent with a high
degree of reliability. And even if a system has the best investigative and trial
procedures in the world, it is a weak
system if its fact finders cannot be
trusted to weigh the evidence fairly
and reach reliable decisions.
In addition, the nearly complete
identification of criminal procedure
with the constitutional rights of defendants means that criminal procedure issues that do not fit within a narrow constitutional context rarely get
raised. Consider, for example, the system's preference for a fact-finding
body that is entirely passive. What are the premises
that justify or support such
a preference? Wouldn't a
trial be more likely to
reach a reliable verdict if
S
the jury could indicate the
evidentiary issues that it
sees as troubling? Or consider another issue ignored in criminal procedure courses: the "wood
shedding" of witnesses by lawyers in
order to rehearse them for their performances in court. Is this consistent
with the premises of our trial system?
What are the effects on the system?
How might such witness preparation
alter the way witnesses see the system
and their roles? Why is the rehearsing
of witnesses to make them more effective on the stand usually considered
highly improper in other Western trial
systems, both adversarial and nonadversarial?
Not well versed in the social sciences
and relying on casebooks that provide
only strings of cases, law professors
and lawyers are more comfortable remaining within the confines of Supreme Court case analysis. But while it
is fun to debate the merits of the good
faith exception to the exclusionary
rule or to try to decipher the latest
pronouncement on how the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments intersect in the interrogation room, a steady diet of

Supreme Court cases encourages students to believe that criminal procedure issues are far simpler than they
actually are. The Court has before it a
nice narrow set of facts and legal briefs
arguing strenuously for or against the
remedy sought. What the Court lacks,
however, is an empirical basis on which
to estimate reliably: (1) how often the
problem at hand comes up around the
country; (2) how serious the problem
is when it does occur; (3) how effective
the proposed remedy is likely to be in
eliminating the problem; and (4) what
the proposed remedy's likely impact
on the system would be in terms of efficiency and reliability.
As a protection for citizens against
clear abuses of state power, these issues

unfair because individual teachers can
use cases as springboards for raising
many different issues. And professors
may teach very different criminal procedure courses out of the same casebooks. But the same weaknesses that
are present in criminal procedure
courses appear in scholarly writing. So
much of it is full of bold suggestions
for the expansion of this or that constitutional right without a historical or
comparative perspective on the perceived problem and without even a
minimal attempt to assess the broader
impact of the remedy on the system as
a whole.
To take one striking example, consider articles that start from the premise that Mirandaand its progeny do not
go nearly far enough because suspects in an interrogation setting are no
match for skilled interrogators and cannot be exS
pected to waive their rights
a full understanding
with
ing
of their constitutional protections. The articles then
is
argue that the Supreme
Court should expand
Miranda by either automatically providing counsel to suspects in advance
of any police questioning
or by simply abolishing all custodial
interrogation. These are radical proposals with possibly devastating implications for cases, such as murder or
rape, where the perpetrator tends not
to stick around after the crime. While
the exact costs of Miranda are often
debated, many suspects continue to
waive their rights and make incriminating statements to the police even
after they receive Mirandawarnings.
Given the radical nature of the various proposals to expand the rights of
suspects, one might think that a
scholar putting forward such an expansion of the right to remain silent
would feel an obligation to put this
proposal in a broader perspective. After all, murders, rapes, and similar serious crimes take place in other countries, these crimes have to be
investigated by the authorities, and
many of these countries guarantee suspects a right to silence in the face of

aw professors and lawyei
are more comfortable remain
within the confines of
upreme Court case analys

should not be important. But when the
Court is trying, through the prism of
defendants' rights, to mandate detailed rules meant to govern all manner of police-citizen contacts as well as
attempting to set the basic parameters
for trial procedure, the narrow focus of
Supreme Court decisions becomes a liability, not a strength. Unfortunately,
the nearly exclusive reliance of criminal procedure courses on Supreme
Court cases turns the Court's institutional weaknesses into pedagogical
weaknesses in the training of future
leaders of the bench and bar. Law
schools encourage the belief that
criminal procedure is about defendants' rights, and that other issues such
as the reliability of the system or how
the system treats those who are not defendants can take care of themselves.

Writing about the system
This criticism of criminal procedure
courses and lawyer training may seem
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(continued on page 102)
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Viewpoint
(from page 59)
official questioning as well as recognize a privilege against self-incrimination. But does any country actually interpret the right to silence in this
radical way? Or for that matter, how
does the balance between suspects and
police in the interrogation room compare to the balance set out by Miranda
and its progeny? It would be sobering
for these scholars to look at interrogation in other countries, especially
those with which we share a common
legal heritage.
But even more important, isn't there
some obligation to attempt to assess
the likely impact of this proposal on
the acquittal rates for different categories of crimes? What does it mean for
the system to go from a waiver rate that
may be as high as 40 or 50 percent to a
system in which stationhouse confessions are rare? Although there is strong
support among scholars for a radical
expansion of suspects' rights under
Miranda, there have been no attempts
to assess the consequences of this expansion. Once discussion of constitutional rights is separated in our thinkDEAN
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ing from difficult concerns about the
impact of those rights on the efficiency
and reliability of the system, rights
analysis becomes simple and straightforward but shallow and superficial.
There is no easy answer to how interrogation should be handled in a modern society. And it certainly is not as
easy as it is assumed to be in most
American legal scholarship. This is
clear from the fact that there is no consensus in other countries on interrogation or on how the right to remain silent should be viewed. In Ireland, an
arrestee must be cautioned prior to
any questioning, but part of the caution informs the suspect that his failure to account for his presence near
the scene of the crime or to account
for any evidence implying his participation in the crime may by introduced
at trial. In England, a suspect has the
right to remain silent, but at the same
time the police have the right to question the suspect. This means that invoking the right to remain silent does
not cut off questioning. While the
right to silence is thus narrower in England than it is in the United States,
this difference will soon be much
more pronounced. Legislation has just
taken effect in England that, among
other things, permits adverse inferences to be drawn from the failure of
the accused to mention any fact to the
police that the accused later relies
upon at trial.
Scotland permits access to a suspect
as a source of evidence in a quite different way. At a committal hearing after charges have been filed, the prosecutor questions the suspect in front
of ajudicial officer with the defendant
having been warned that failure to answer any question may be introduced
at trial if the defendant raises a point
in his defense that he failed to mention during his committal questioning.
These comparative perspectives are
admittedly sketchy and superficial.
They are offered not to advocate a certain position but to provide an idea of
the rich comparative perspective available on proposals to alter our system.
One might think that a system that engraves so much of its criminal proceSeptember-October 1995

dure into constitutional stone woulc
be extremely careful and cautiou!
about what it is doing since it is noi
easy to undo mistakes. But it seem!
that constitutional analysis has quit(
the opposite effect: it liberates aca
demics so that they are free to offei
suggestions for reform based on in
complete and simplistic analysis.

As persons trained in a common la,"
system, academics and lawyers arc
naturally more comfortable working
with parts of the system than with the
whole. Civil law lawyers do not have
this problem because their systems are
built from the ground up in detailed
codes of criminal procedure, and an)
proposed reform is always viewed and
discussed as a part of the whole. Be.
cause the American criminal justice
system has no such common reference
point and because our system tends tc
evolve bit by bit, it should be the responsibility of the academic commu.
nity to help lawyers, judges, and la1

students gain perspective on the system as a whole. But instead, it prefers
to stay within the comfortable bounds
of Supreme Court case analysis. Whatever may have been its merits in times
past, taking students up and down
lines of Supreme Court cases on issues
such as search and seizure and interrogation, in which subtle distinction is
piled upon subtle distinction, is insufficient to meet today's responsibilities.
Our criminal justice system does no(
need another subdivision of this or
that line of cases but rather a reform
that looks at the system and asks some
hard questions about how well the system is functioning in terms of its reliability, the way it is using its resources,
and the way it treats those who come in
contact with it. Unfortunately, law
schools are not currently turning out
lawyers equipped to lead such a reform effort. V1

